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A beehive contains thousands of bees, each of which can fly several miles for a pinch of pollen or a drop of nectar. Unless farms using
pollinators were huge or isolated, it therefore seems unlikely that a beekeeper could ever get all the growers located in the foraging range
of her hives to pay for the pollination services provided by her foraging bees. Conversely, it is unlikely that a grower could ever find a way
to charge all the beekeepers for the pollen and nectar that their bees collect from her fields. With such a picture in mind, many
economists would assume pollination in agriculture to be fertile ground for externalities. \cite{Meade1952} was maybe the first
economist to use the canonical story of the beekeeper and the apple grower to illustrate how the existence of ``unpaid factors'' resulted
in under‐investment, here in apple trees and bees. His appealing illustration of positive externality remains to this day a staple of
economicstextbooks.
Two illustrative examples
First, imagine almond orchards owned by separate farmers who rent hives to pollinate their crops. As a simplifying approximation, the
almond trees provide no resource for bees and the only revenue for the beekeeper in this contract comes from pollination fees. The fee
per hive that a single grower pays is independent of the specifics of diffusion across her orchard and her neighbor's since the pollination
fee is determined by the market rental rate for hives. A grower hires bees until the value of the marginal increase in her crop yield is equal
to the market rental rate for hives. As a result, diffusion creates an externality among growers. A grower has clear incentives to free ride
on bees renter by others. Underinvestment in bees could result from free riding among the growers, but the relationship between a
grower and her beekeeper is not much different than the ones the grower maintains with her fertilizer or labor providers. The externality
is among growers and not between growers and beekeepers.
In the second example, growers of citrus lease their orchards to beekeepers as a source of nectar. Assume that the varieties of citrus
involved neither benefit nor are damaged by bee visits. In this situation, beekeepers pay a location fee for access to groves from which
nectar can be collected and honey produced. The value of a location to beekeepers depends on how much nectar is accessible from it. If
the market for locations is competitive, each grower will receive in the form of location fees the marginal value of the nectar accessible
from placing bees at her location as an input to honey production. Externalities occur when a grower rents out a location from which
bees can access to her neighbor's nectar. Underinvestment in citrus trees can occur when the value of the trees' nectar is captured from
groves other than the ones operated by the growers that receives the fees.
A model of externalities among growers
The problem of free riding among crop growers case is mentioned by Cheung who notes the existence of an informal custom among
almond growers which discourages free riding for pollination services. According to Cheung's depiction of ``The Custom of the Orchards'',
almond growers expect each other to stock their orchards with hives at a same density as their neighbors. Although we have not heard
mention of this custom in conversations with current almond growers in California, known free‐riders are still considered to be bad
neighbors. The problem has not involved any formal institution, and free riding is not listed among major concerns by growers in the
almondindustry.
Free riding among crop growers
The problem of free riding among crop growers case is mentioned by Cheung who notes the existence of an informal custom
among almond growers which discourages free riding for pollination services. According to Cheung's depiction of ``The
Custom of the Orchards'', almond growers expect each other to stock their orchards with hives at a same density as their
neighbors. Although we have not heard mention of this custom in conversations with current almond growers in California,
known free‐riders are still considered to be bad neighbors. The problem has not involved any formal institution, and free
ridingis not listed amongmajorconcernsby growers in the almondindustry.
The pollination services provided by wild pollinators
Consider the diffusion of pollinators between wild habitat and farms. In this case, the diffusion is not limited to a single
species but involves a number of wild insects in addition to managed bees. For simplicity, we consider wild pollinators as one
group of pollinators and therefore only make a distinction between wild and managed pollinators. Under this assumption,
the general model of pollinator diffusion above can be adapted to this special case by changing one of the farmers into the
ownerof wild habitat.
Pesticide damage to honey bees
The third third case of externality caused by pollinator diffusion is that of pesticide damages to domestic honey bees which
have long been a concern for beekeepers. In general, beekeepers and the growers they contract with coordinate the
placement of hives and the timing of pesticide application to limit damage to bees. However, it is difficult for individual
beekeepers to ensure that pesticides are applied nowhere in the entire foraging range of their hives. But here again, the
externality caused by diffusion is one occurring among growers as long as the market for pollination services or honey
locations is competitive. Indeed, a farmer surrounded by neighbors who apply pesticides during the bloom of his crop will
have to compensate for bee losses or pay a risk premium to his beekeeper which will result in either higher pollination fees,
orsmaller location fees.
Crop damage from honey bee pollination
Cases where pollination visits by insects damage crops have been very rarely documented. \cite{Olmstead1987} reports that
bees where thought once to be pests for alfalfa seed production but they turned out to be the opposite. A handful of
authors argue that bees in large numbers may decrease crop yield, for instance by extracting large amounts of nectar and
thus reducing the resources available to the plant for fruit production.
The difference in the political economy of beekeeping in the two regions provides reasonable candidate hypothesis to
explain the difference in the resolutions of this negative pollination externality. In California, beekeepers have the support of
a large almond industry to which they provide valuable pollination services. In the region of Valencia, citrus production is the
single largest agricultural industry and beekeepers do not provide pollination services to any valuable crop.
Pollination Markets
Cheungnoted the existence of pollination markets.
Modeling foraging behavior and spatial diffusion of bees 